For an investor with constant absolute risk aversion and a long horizon, who trades in a market with constant investment opportunities and small proportional transaction costs, we obtain explicitly the optimal investment policy, its implied welfare, liquidity premium, and trading volume. We identify these quantities as the limits of their isoelastic counterparts for high levels of risk aversion. The results are robust with respect to finite horizons, and extend to multiple uncorrelated risky assets.
Introduction
Despite their singular behavior, investors with constant absolute risk aversion are familiar figures in financial economics, thanks to their tractable character. Such investors, defined by exponential utility functions, are indeed peculiar for both portfolios and prices. With constant investment opportunities, they insist on keeping in risky assets a fixed amount of money, regardless of their wealth. If asked to price a claim, their answer depends neither on wealth, nor on risk aversion. Consuming over time, they do not disdain negative consumption, especially at later dates. Yet, their actions are often easier to grasp than the proper but impenetrable behavior of isoelastic investors. 1 Hence, exponential utility remains a central tool to glean insights from complex models, such as the ones with frictions.
This paper examines the implications of exponential utility for long-run portfolio choice with small transaction costs. For an exponential investor, with constant investment opportunities and a long planning horizon, we find the optimal trading policy, its welfare, the liquidity premium, and trading volume. We then allow a risk neutral, monopolistic market maker to set the spread as to maximize profits, obtaining an endogenous spread that depends on investment opportunities alone.
Our analysis leads to new economic implications, and sheds new light on existing results. We find that investing optimally on a long horizon is equivalent to receiving, over the same period, a fixed equivalent annuity, found explicitly, which does not depend on the horizon. This fact is well-known in the frictionless case, but fails for transaction costs with a finite horizon, due to the spurious effects of portfolio set-up and liquidation. As in the isoelastic case, transaction costs entail a small reduction in the equivalent annuity.
The equivalent annuity, trading boundaries, and absolute turnover are inversely proportional to risk aversion, as in the frictionless case, while relative turnover and the liquidity premium are independent of risk aversion. We identify all these quantities as the limits of their isoelastic counterparts, as relative risk aversion becomes large. This result suggests that exponential utility is a useful tool to study isoelastic investors with high risk aversion.
Our results are robust to finite horizons and to several assets. For a finite horizon, we derive bounds on the investor's certainty equivalent, whose time average converges to the equivalent annuity. In a market with several uncorrelated assets, one-dimensional trading policies remain optimal, leading to the same liquidity premia and trading volumes, while equivalent annuities add in the cross section.
Finally, we endogenize the spread by allowing a risk-neutral, monopolistic market maker to fix it to maximize expected profits. Unlike the investor, whose policy and welfare depend on the bid and ask prices alone, the market maker's profits depend on the book price, which lies within the bid-ask spread, and represents the price at which the market maker's inventory is valued. The resulting endogenous spread is independent of risk aversion, and hence depends only on investment opportunities, and on the book price. When the latter is chosen close to the ask price, realistic values of investment opportunities lead to spreads of a few percentage points.
Our results also have novel mathematical implications. We obtain new finite-horizon bounds, which measure the monetary value of investment opportunities for an exponential investor, and are expressed in terms of the risk neutral probability. For isoelastic investors, such bounds involve the myopic probability, under which a hypothetical logarithmic investor adopts the same policy as the original investor under the physical probability. Thus, for exponential investors, the risk neutral probability plays a similar role as the myopic probability for isoelastic investors. This analogy is central to obtain a new kind of verification theorem, which stems from the finite-horizon bounds.
In addition, we prove the first rigorous asymptotic expansions for small transaction costs and exponential utility, complementing the heuristics of Whalley and Wilmott (1997) , Mokkhavesa and Atkinson (2002) , and Goodman and Ostrov (2010) , as well as results for the isoelastic case, cf. Shreve and Soner (1994) , Rogers (2004) , Janeček and Shreve (2004) , Gerhold, Muhle-Karbe and Schachermayer (2010b,a) , and Bichuch (2011) .
More broadly, our results are related to the literature on exponential utility with transaction costs, both in the context of portfolio choice (Mokkhavesa and Atkinson, 2002; Liu, 2004; Goodman and Ostrov, 2010) and of option pricing (Davis, Panas and Zariphopoulou, 1993; Whalley and Wilmott, 1997; Barles and Soner, 1998) . In contrast to these papers, we remove consumption and random endowment from our model, focusing instead on long-horizon asymptotics for tractability. This approach is common for isoelastic utilities (Taksar, Klass and Assaf, 1988; Dumas and Luciano, 1991; Gerhold, Muhle-Karbe and Schachermayer, 2010b) . Unaccountably, it seems unexplored for the exponential class. Our analysis of endogenous spreads is closest to the work of Luciano (2011) on equilibrium between isoelastic investors and dealers, with the difference that we pair an exponential investor with a risk-neutral dealer.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and our main results. Their main implications are discussed in Section 3; afterwards they are derived on an informal level in Section 4, and then proved in Section 5.
Model and Main Result

Market
The market has a safe asset S 0 t = 1 and a risky asset, trading at ask (buying) price S. The bid (selling) price is S(1 − ε), hence ε ∈ (0, 1) is the relative bid-ask spread. Denoting by W a standard Brownian motion, the ask price S follows dS t /S t = µdt + σdW t , where µ > 0 is the expected excess return and σ > 0 is the volatility. The mean-variance ratiō µ = µ/σ 2 turns out to be a key parameter in the solution.
A self-financing trading strategy is an R 2 -valued predictable process (ϕ 0 , ϕ) of finite variation: (ϕ 0 0− , ϕ 0− ) = (ξ 0 , ξ) ∈ R 2 represents the initial positions (in units) in the safe and risky asset, and ϕ 0 t and ϕ t denote the positions held at time t ≥ 0. Writing ϕ t = ϕ ↑ t − ϕ ↓ t as the difference between the cumulative number of shares bought (ϕ ↑ t ) and sold (ϕ ↓ t ) by time t, the self-financing condition dictates that the cash balance ϕ 0 changes only due to trading activity in the number of shares ϕ:
Trading strategies are further restricted from unlimited borrowing by the following admissibility condition, which rules out doubling strategies: 2 Definition 2.1. A self-financing strategy (ϕ 0 , ϕ) is admissible if the risky position ϕS is a.s. uniformly bounded.
The liquidation value of the wealth associated to an admissible strategy is denoted by
Preferences
An investor with constant absolute risk aversion α > 0, which corresponds to the exponential utility function U (x) = −e −αx , maximizes the certainty equivalent U −1 (E[U (X)]), which for exponential utility reduces to:
In a market with constant investment opportunities the certainty equivalent increases linearly with the horizon.Hence, we focus on the certainty equivalent per unit of time, which is the same as a fixed annuity.
Definition 2.2. A strategy (ϕ 0 , ϕ) is long-run optimal if it maximizes the equivalent annuity
EA α = max ϕ EA α (ϕ) denotes the maximal equivalent annuity.
Main Result
The next theorem contains our main results. Recall thatμ = µ/σ 2 is the mean-variance ratio.
Theorem 2.
3. An investor with constant absolute risk aversion α > 0 trades to maximize the equivalent annuity. Then, for a small bid-ask spread ε > 0:
For the investor, trading the risky asset with transaction costs is equivalent to leaving all wealth in the safe asset, while receiving the equivalent annuity (the gapλ is defined in iv) below):
ii) (Liquidity Premium) Trading the risky asset with transaction costs is equivalent to trading a hypothetical asset, at no transaction costs, with the same volatility σ, but with a lower exptected excess return σ 2 μ 2 −λ 2 . Thus, the liquidity premium is
iii) (Trading Policy) It is optimal to keep the value of the risky position within the buy and sell boundaries
where η α− and η α+ are evaluated at ask and bid prices, respectively.
iv) (Gap)
The gapλ is the unique value for which the solution of the initial value problem
also satisfies the terminal value condition
In view of the explicit formula for w(x,λ) in Lemma 5.1 below, this is a scalar equation forλ.
v) (Trading Volume) Relative turnover, defined as shares traded d||ϕ|| t divided by shares held |ϕ t |, has long-term average
Absolute turnover, defined as value of wealth traded, has long term-average: 3
The following expansions in terms of the bid-ask spread ε hold: 4
The proof of Theorem 2.3 exploits the construction of a shadow price, i.e., a fictitious risky asset evolving within the bid-ask spread, which is equivalent to the transaction cost market in terms of both welfare and the optimal policy. This is the approach used for power utility by Gerhold, Guasoni, Muhle-Karbe and Schachermayer (2011) (henceforth GGMKS) .
3 The number of shares is written as the difference ϕt = ϕ ↑ t − ϕ ↓ t of cumulative shares bought and sold, and wealth is evaluated at trading prices, i.e., at the bid price (1 − ε)St when selling, and at the ask price St when buying.
4 Algorithmic calculations can deliver terms of arbitrarily high order.
Theorem 2.4 (Shadow price). The policy in Theorem 2.3 iii) and the equivalent annuity in Theorem 2.3 i) are also optimal for a frictionless risky asset with shadow priceS, which always lies within the bid-ask spread, and coincides with the trading price at times of trading for the optimal policy. The shadow price follows
for deterministic functionsμ(·) andσ(·) given explicitly in Lemma 5.6. The state variable Y t = log(ϕ t S t /l(λ)) represents the centered logarithm of the risky position, which is a Brownian motion with drift reflected to remain in the interval [0, log(u(λ)/l(λ))], i.e.,
Here, L t and U t are nondecreasing processes, corresponding to the relative purchases and sales, respectively (cf. Lemma 5.9). In the interior of the no-trade region, i.e., when the risky position lies in (l(λ), u(λ)), the numbers of units of the safe and risky asset are constant, and the state variable Y t follows Brownian motion with drift. When Y t reaches the boundary of the no-trade region, buying or selling takes place so as to keep it within [l(λ), u(λ)].
Implications and Applications
Theorem 2.3 presents both analogies with and departures from the isoelastic case in GGMKS.
One analogy is that the trading policy depends on the market only through the mean-variance ratioμ. All other quantities also only depend onμ in business time. Measured in calendar time, they scale linearly with the market's variance σ 2 .
In a departure from power utility, the gapλ is independent of the investor's risk aversion α here. Hence, the liquidity premium and relative turnover are also common to all investors with constant absolute risk aversion. The equivalent annuity and trading boundaries, however, are inversely proportional to risk aversion, as in the frictionless case, and so is absolute turnover.
Further, in this model a strategy of full investment in the risky asset is never optimal, regardless of the risk aversion α, and the only solution without trading obtains with a null risk premiumμ = 0. The absence of full risky investment is a consequence of constant trading boundaries in terms of monetary amounts rather than fractions of wealth.
In spite of these differences, the model-and preference-free relationships for power utilities (GGMKS, Section 3.5) carry over to the exponential case. For example, the universal relation
between the liquidity premium LiPr, the spread ε, and the relative turnover ShTu remains valid for exponential utilities. Thus, this relation not only holds both across market and preference parameters, but is also the same for both families.
3.1 Trading policy and average risky position.
In analogy with the isoelastic case, the optimal policy is to keep the risky position between two boundaries. Unlike for the isoelastic case, but as in the frictionless setting, trading boundaries are measured not as fractions of wealth, but as monetary amounts. The novelty is that these boundaries are symmetric around the frictionless optimum. In apparent contrast, Liu (2004) finds numerically that average risky holdings (over the investment period) increase with transaction costs, suggesting that more transaction costs reduce an investor's effective risk aversion. In fact, our results are consistent with his findings, once we observe that, if the risk premium is large enough, the risky position is on average closer to the sell than to the buy boundary, even as the boundaries are equidistant from the frictionless solution. To see this, it suffices to calculate the average risky position, using the stationary distribution of the reflected geometric Brownian motion
To obtain an asymptotic expansion for small transaction costs, recall that l(λ) = (μ −λ)/α and u(λ) = (μ +λ)/(1 − ε)α. Then, the expansion forλ yields:
As a result, forμ > 1 the average risky position tends to be higher than the frictionless valueμ/α, and vice versa forμ < 1. This effect is entirely due to the skewness of the stationary distribution towards the upper boundary, because the boundaries (μ ± λ)/α are symmetric aroundμ/α. Thus, the estimatorα obtained by comparing the average risky holding in (3.1) to the frictionless formulā µ/α is given by:
This estimator underestimates true risk aversion forμ > 1, with larger transaction costs leading to a larger bias, and explains the observation of Liu (2004) that transaction costs seem to reduce effective risk aversion.
Convergence and high risk aversion asymptotics
The formulas in Theorem 2.3 for exponential utilities are closely related to the limits of the corresponding isoelastic quantities in GGMKS. The next result makes this relation precise, and justifies the dual interpretation of the aforementioned formulas as high risk aversion asymptotics for isoelastic investors, in the same spirit as inČerný (2009) and Nutz (2011) .
Theorem 3.1 (High risk aversion asymptotics). An investor with constant relative risk aversion γ > 0 trades to achieve the maximal equivalent safe rate ESR γ = max ϕ ESR γ (ϕ), where
Denote byλ γ , 5 LiPr γ , π γ± , ShTu γ and WeTu γ the corresponding gap, liquidity premium, trading boundaries (as wealth fractions), share turnover, and (relative) wealth turnover (see GGMKS for details). Then, as γ ↑ ∞, the following properties hold for a small spread ε > 0:
(i) The equivalent safe rate times relative risk aversion converges to the equivalent annuity times absolute risk aversion, i.e.,
(ii) The gapλ γ converges to the gapλ.
(iii) The liquidity premium LiPr γ converges to LiPr.
(iv) The trading boundaries π γ± as wealth fractions, times γ, converge to the trading boundaries η α± , as position values, times α, i.e.,
(v) Share turnover ShTu γ converges to relative turnover ShTu.
(vi) Relative wealth turnover, times γ, converges to absolute turnover times α.
This result clarifies some properties of the isoelastic quantities. For example (GGMKS, Section 3.4), share turnover converges to a finite limit as relative risk aversion increases. Theorem 2.3 identifies this limit as the relative turnover of exponential utility. By contrast, relative wealth turnover declines to zero as risk aversion increases but, once rescaled by γ, it converges to absolute turnover for exponential utility.
Trading Volume and Endogenous Spreads
An attraction of exponential utility is that, because the value of the investor's risky position is bounded, then also total rebalancing costs are bounded. These costs are in turn related to the profits of a market maker, who earns the costs paid by the investor. Thus, exponential utility is well-suited to develop a valuation model of a market maker, in which both trading and spreads are endogenous.
If the market maker acts as a monopolist, and sets the spread so as to maximize profits, the model yields an endogenous optimal spread, which depends on investment opportunities only. The monopolist tradeoff is clear: a larger spread increases the profit of each transaction, but reduces demand for trading.
Bid and ask prices alone are not sufficient to determine the market maker profits. What is missing is the "book" priceS t , at which the market maker is allowed to value his inventory. Such a price must be within the bid-ask spread: whichever policy the investor chooses, the average execution price will be within the bid-ask spread. Thus, we denote the book value byS t = S t (1−εδ), with δ = 0 and δ = 1 leading to the ask and bid prices respectively. With this notation, the average profits are:
In other words, while the investor is only sensitive to the final bid and ask prices, the market maker's profits depend separately on sales or purchases, depending on the choice of the book price. PluggingS t = S t (1 − εδ) in the above expression, and passing to the limit as T ↑ ∞, average profits become equal to:
where WeTu − and WeTu + denote the expressions for expected purchases and sales, which add to absolute turnover in Theorem 2.3: Figure 1: Expected value of future fees (vertical axis, in dollars) against the spread ε (horizontal axis). The plot compares the case of fees earned 100% on purchases (solid line), 90% on purchases and 10% on sales (long dashing), 50% on each (medium dashing), and 100% on sales (short dashing). Parameters are µ = 8%, σ = 16%, and α = (µ/σ 2 )/100, corresponding to a frictionless position of η = µ/ασ 2 = 100 dollars. Figure 1 shows the market maker's expected profit, as a function of the spread ε, for δ = 1, 0.9, 0.5, 0. When profits are concentrated on purchases (δ = 1 or 0.9), the market maker optimally sets the spread in the range of 3-4%. This value is high compared to the spreads currently observed in US and European equities, in which market makers are no longer monopolists. However, such a figure is typical of the spreads observed on small capitalization stocks (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986) , which are traded by fewer dealers.
By contrast, the model leads to unreasonably high spreads, well above 20%, if the profits are split equally between sales and purchases, or concentrated on sales (δ = 0.5 or 0). This result, if counterintuitive initially, is implied by the asymmetry between expected sales (δ = 0) and expected purchases (δ = 1). Because the exponential investor wants to keep the risky position approximately fixed, and because the risky asset grows on average, the investor steadily realizes past gains over time, as the risky position reaches the selling boundary. By contrast, purchases occur after large drops in the asset price, which are much less frequent.
This observation in fact hints at a weakness of the model, the absence of dividends, which in practice allow the investor to avoid selling shares, cashing dividends instead. Thus, using a value of δ close to 1 is a plausible assumption, which remedies in part the absence of dividends in the model.
Finite Horizon Bounds. Myopic Probability as Risk Neutral.
A novel aspect of our analysis is the derivation of finite horizon bounds (Guasoni and Robertson, 2011) in the context of exponential utility. These bounds offer estimates on the performance of the candidate long-run optimal policy on any intermediate horizon T . They are both a mathematical device to prove the verification theorem, and a diagnostic tool to determine at which horizons the long-run optimal policy is effective enough. For exponential utility, finite horizon bounds admit an especially appealing form, in monetary units. As for isoelastic utilities, the respective asymptotics show that -at the first order -our stationary long-run policy is also optimal for any fixed finite horizon T > 0, because the corresponding utility matches the finite horizon value function at the first nontrivial order.
Theorem 3.2 (Finite horizon bounds). For any horizon T > 0, the payoffX φ T of a generic admissible strategy φ in the frictionless shadow marketS satisfies
For the shadow payoff corresponding to the long-run optimal strategy ϕ from Theorem 2.3,
HereẼ[·] denotes the expectation with respect to the unique risk-neutral probability forS, Y the centered logarithm of the risky position in Theorem 2.4, andq the deterministic function defined in Lemma 5.7 below.
A new mathematical insight of this theorem is that, with exponential utility, the risk neutral probability replaces the myopic probability in the finite-horizon bounds. By definition, under the myopic probability the logarithmic policy coincides with the optimal policy under the real probability. Thus, strictly speaking, a risk-neutral probability is never myopic, because a logarithmic investor (in fact, any investor) takes a zero position in a risky asset with null return.
Yet, the finite-horizon bounds in the theorem above involve expectations under the risk-neutral probability, just as the similar bounds in Guasoni and Robertson (2011) involve expectations under the myopic probability. The intuition is that, as relative risk aversion increases, the risky weight in the optimal isoelastic policy decreases to zero, and so does the drift under the myopic probability. Even as the weight decreases to zero, the monetary position can converge to a finite amount, as it happens for exponential utility.
Duality theory sheds further light on the bounds. For any payoff X and any stochastic discount factor (or martingale density) M = dQ/dP , Jensen's inequality implies that:
For a fixed payoff X, this inequality still holds passing to the infimum over M , thereby indicating that equality may only hold when M has minimal entropy. This abstract inequality also shows that the minimal entropy is interpreted as a monetary certainty equivalent, which represents the opportunity value of trading in the market over a given horizon. In the statement in Theorem 3.2, this opportunity value decomposes into the integral term, which increases linearly with the horizon, and leads to the equivalent annuity, and into the transitory term withq, which oscillates with the relative position of the portfolio within the no-trade region.
Multiple Risky Assets
Consider a market with risky assets S 1 , . . . , S d following
for excess returns µ i > 0, volatilities σ i > 0, and independent standard Brownian motions W i . With exponential utility, the optimal policy in a market with several such independent risky assets entails no-trade regions for each asset, which coincide with the no-trade regions obtained for each risky asset alone, that is, in a market with a single risky asset (Liu, 2004) . In our setting, the following verification theorem applies, which allows to avoid the technical conditions in Liu (2004) . The implication is that the equivalent annuity for multiple independent risky assets is the sum of the equivalent annuities for each asset.
Theorem 3.3. For i = 1, . . . , d, letS i be the shadow price from Lemma 5.6, with corresponding optimal strategy (ϕ 0,i , ϕ i ) from Lemma 5.8 in the market with safe asset S 0 and risky asset S i . Then, S = (S 1 , . . . ,S d ) is a shadow price in the market with safe asset S 0 and risky assets S 1 , . . . , S d , with optimal strategy ( d i=1 ϕ 0,i , ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ d ) and corresponding equivalent annuity
Here,μ i = µ i /σ 2 i and each gapλ i is defined as in item iv) of Theorem 3.3. Moreover, like the equivalent annuity, relative and absolute turnover also add across independent assets.
These decompositions are unique for exponential utility, and fail for utilities in the isoelastic class. For example, Akian, Menaldi and Sulem (1996) show that, in a market with two identical and independent assets, the no-trade region for each asset is wider than the no-trade region for a market with that asset alone. As a result, the equivalent safe rate for the two-asset market is greater than the sum of the equivalent safe rates.
Safe Rate
Throughout the paper, we assume a zero safe rate. This choice is made in part for notational convenience, and the results can be adapted to the case of a constant safe rate r, with an important caveat. For an exponential investor with a long horizon, an arbitrarily small safe rate r is preferable to any risky investment opportunityμ. The reason is that the optimal policy of this particularly risk averse investor is to keep only a bounded amount of money in the risky asset, whence her wealth on average grows linearly over time. By contrast, a positive safe rate allows wealth to grow exponentially -without risk. Therefore, full investment in the safe asset is eventually preferred by the exponential investor in the long run.
Nevertheless, the finite horizon bounds in Theorem 3.2 remain valid even for a positive safe rate. Indeed, settingα = e rT α in Theorem 3.2 for discounted payoffs, it follows that the undiscounted payoffX φ T of any admissible strategy φ in the frictionless shadow marketS satisfies
Likewise, the shadow payoff of the long-run optimal strategy ϕ in Theorem 2.3 satisfies
Hence, our long-run optimal policy still matches the finite horizon value functions up to terms of order O(ε/T ). However, as the horizon becomes large, the contribution of the risky investment grows only linearly with the horizon T . Hence it becomes negligible, as the certainty equivalent grows exponentially.
Heuristics
In this section, we first use informal arguments from stochastic control to determine a candidate for the optimal policy. Then, we derive a candidate shadow price process, which is key for the subsequent verification.
Optimal policy
For a trading strategy (ϕ 0 t , ϕ t ), write the number of stocks ϕ = ϕ ↑ − ϕ ↓ as the difference of the cumulated numbers of stocks purchased and sold, and denote by
the values of the safe and risky positions in terms of the ask price S t . Then, the self-financing condition, and the dynamics of S imply
Consider the problem of maximizing the expected exponential utility U (x) = −e −αx from terminal wealth at time T . Denote by V (t, x, y) its value function, which depends on time as well as the positions in bonds and stocks. Itô's formula yields:
where the arguments of the functions are omitted for brevity. Because V (t, X 0 t , X t ) must be a supermartingale for any choice of the cumulative purchases and sales ϕ ↑ , ϕ ↓ (which are increasing processes), it follows that V y − V x ≤ 0 and (
In the interior of this region, the drift of V (t, X 0 t , X t ) cannot be positive, and must become zero for the optimal policy,
To simplify further, we use the usual scaling for exponential utility (cf., e.g., Davis, Panas and Zariphopoulou (1993) ). Moreover -in the long run -the value function should grow exponentially with the horizon at a constant rate. This leads to the following ansatz for the value function:
which reduces the HJB equation to
Conjecturing that the set {x : 1 <
−αv(x)
v (x) < 1 1−ε } coincides with some interval l ≤ x ≤ u to be determined, the following free boundary problem arises:
These conditions are not enough to identify the solution, because they can be matched for any choice of the trading boundaries l, u. The optimal boundaries are the ones that also satisfy the smooth-pasting conditions (cf. Dumas (1991) ), formally obtained by differentiating (4.3) and (4.4) with respect to l and u, respectively:
In addition to the reduced value function v, this system requires to solve forβ (and hence the equivalent annuity σ 2β ) as well as the trading boundaries l and u. Substituting (4.5) and (4.3) into (4.2) yields
Setting η α− = l, and factoring out −αv, it follows that
Note that η α− is the risky position when it is time to buy, and hence the risky position is valued at the ask price. The same argument for u shows that the other solution of the quadratic equation is η α+ = u(1 − ε), i.e., the risky position when it is time to sell, and hence the risky position is valued at the bid price. Thus, the optimal policy is to buy when the "ask" position falls below η α− , sell when the "bid" position rises above η α+ , and do nothing in between. Since η α− and η α+ solve the same quadratic equation, they are related toβ via
It is convenient to setβ = (μ 2 −λ 2 )/2α, becauseβ =μ 2 /2α without transaction costs. With this notation, the buy and sell boundaries are just
Now that l(λ), u(λ) are identified by η α± in terms ofλ, it remains to findλ. After deriving l(λ) and u(λ), the boundaries in the problem (4.2)-(4.4) are no longer free, but fixed. With the substitution
, the boundary problem (4.2)-(4.4) simplifies to a Riccati ODE:
w(0) =μ −λ, (4.8)
where
For eachλ, the initial value problem (4.7)-(4.8) has a solution w(λ, ·), and the correct value ofλ is identified by the second boundary condition (4.9): w(λ, log(u(λ)/l(λ))) =μ +λ.
(4.10)
Shadow Market
The key to making the above arguments rigorous is to find a frictionless shadow priceS, which yields the same optimal policy as the one derived in the previous section. This step requires another heuristic argument. As for logarithmic utility (Gerhold, Muhle-Karbe and Schachermayer, 2010b,a) and power utility (GGMKS), the idea is thatS/S, the ratio between the shadow and the ask price, should only depend on the state variable. Hence, we look for a shadow price of the form
where e Yt = X t /l is the risky position at the ask price S, and centered at the buying boundary
number of units ϕ remains constant inside the no-trade region, so that in its interior the dynamics of Y = log(ϕ/l) + log(S) coincides with that of log(S). Moreover, since
Y must remain in [0, log(u/l)] by definition, Y is reflected at the boundaries. Hence,
for nondecreasing local time processes L, U that only increase on {Y t = 0} (resp. {Y t = log(u/l)}).
The function g : [1, u/l] → [1, (1 − ε)u/l] is a C 2 -function satisfying the smooth pasting conditions (cf. Gerhold, Muhle-Karbe and Schachermayer (2010b))
The first two conditions ensure thatS equals the ask price S (resp. the bid price S(1 − ε)) when Y sits at the buying boundary 0 (resp. at the selling boundary log(u/l)), while the latter two conditions ensure that the diffusion coefficient ofS t /S t vanishes both at the bid (1 − ε) and at the ask (1), and hence that these bounds are not breached. The boundary conditions for g , and Itô's formula imply thatS is an Itô process with dynamics
whereμ (y) = µg (e y )e y + σ 2 2 g (e y )e 2y g(e y )
, andσ(y) = σg (e y )e y g(e y )
.
To identify the function g, first derive the HJB equation for a generic g. Then, compare this equation to the one obtained in the previous section for the market with transaction costs. Because the value function of the two problems must be the same, matching the two HJB equations identifies the function g.
The wealth process corresponding to the policy 6η in terms of the shadow priceS is
With the standard ansatzṼ t =Ṽ (t,X t , Y t ) for the value function, Itô's formula yields
where the arguments of the functions are omitted for brevity. SinceṼ must be a supermartingale for any strategy, and a martingale for the optimal strategy, the HJB equation reads as:
with the Neumann boundary conditions
The homogeneity of the value function, (i.e.,Ṽ (t, x, y) = −e −αxṽ (t, y)) leads to the first-order condition:η
Plugging this equality back into the HJB equation yields the nonlinear equatioñ
Now, the long-run growth rate of the optimal policy must be the same for the shadow market as for the transaction cost market in the previous section. Thus, in view of (4.1), set
, which implies thatṽ t = αβσ 2ṽ andṽ y /ṽ = −w. Then, the HJB equation reduces to the inhomogeneous Riccati ODEw
with the boundary conditionsw (0) =w(log(u/l)) = 0.
ForS to be a shadow price, its value functioñ
must coincide with the value function
Note that this is the monetary amount rather than the fraction of wealth in the risky asset.
for the transaction cost problem derived above. By definition, the safe position X 0 and the wealth X in terms ofS = Se −Y g(e Y ) are related viã
Now, the conditionṼ = V implies that 0 = αg(e y )l + y 0 (w(z) − w(z))dz, which in turn means thatw (y) = w(y) − αg (e y )e y l. Plugging this relation into the ODE (4.12) forw, using the ODE (4.7) for w, and simplifying gives −w(y) +μ (y)
Inserting the definitions ofμ(y) andσ(y), this relation is tantamount to the following ODE for g:
g (e y )e y g (e y ) + 2μ − 2w(y) = 0. (4.13)
Now, the substitution 7
g (e y )e y , i.e., g(e
reduces this ODE to the inhomogeneous linear equation
(4.14)
The smooth pasting condition for g implies k(0) = 1/g (1) = 1. The solution to (4.14) then follows from the variation of constants formula. Plugging in the explicit formula (5.1) for w, and integrating, leads to (with a = a(λ) and b = b(λ) as in (5.2)) the solution 8
Now the chain of substitutions is reversed starting from k, which is known explicitly up to the constantλ. First, setw(y) = w(y) − αl/k(y); thenw(0) = 0 by the initial conditions for w and k.
To establish the other boundary conditionw(log(u/l)) = 0, it suffices to check that k(log(u/l)) = (μ −λ)/(μ +λ). To see this, insert the boundary condition for w , 15) into the explicit formula for k(y). 9 Now, observe that the function
For the second representation, we already use the boundary condition g(1) = 1. 8 Here we only show the caseμ > 1/4. The other case leads to another explicit formula, whence similar calculations follow.
9 The first equalities in (4.15) follows from the ODE for w, whereas the second equality is obtained from the explicit formula (5.1).
evidently satisfies g(1) = 1. Moreover, g(u/l) = (1 − ε)u/l, which follows by inserting the terminal condition for w,μ +λ = w(log(u/l)) = a tan tan
into the explicit expression for g. Finally, these boundary conditions for g and those for k imply that g (1) = 1 and g (u/l) = 1 − ε, i.e., g satisfies the smooth pasting conditions (4.11) and, by construction, also the ODE (4.13).
Proofs
In the previous section we first found a candidate optimal policy and the corresponding value function, using informal control arguments. Then, we used this guess to derive a candidate shadow price, matching a generic shadow value function with the one of the transaction cost problem. In this section, we prove a verification theorem for the optimal policy in the frictionless market corresponding to the candidate shadow price process, and show that the optimal shadow strategy only entails purchasing (selling) when the shadow price coincides with the ask (bid) price. Thus, the policy is also feasible and optimal in the market with transaction costs.
Key to this goal are the new finite horizon bounds for exponential utility in Theorem 3.2.
Explicit formulas and their properties
The first step to construct the shadow price is to determine, for a given smallλ > 0, an explicit expression for the solution w of the ODE (4.7), complemented by the initial condition (4.8).
Lemma 5.1. For sufficiently smallλ > 0, the function
is a local solution of
Moreover, x → w(λ, x) is increasing in both cases.
Proof. The first part of the assertion is verified by taking derivatives. The second follows by inspection of the explicit formulas.
Next, establish that the crucial constantλ, which determines both the no-trade region and the equivalent annuity, is well-defined.
Lemma 5.2. Let w(λ, ·) be defined as in Lemma 5.1, and set
Then, for sufficiently small ε > 0, there exists a unique solutionλ of
As ε ↓ 0, it has the asymptoticsλ
Proof. The explicit expression for w in Lemma 5.1 implies that w(λ, x) in Lemma 5.1 is analytic in both variables at (0, 0). By the initial condition in (5.3), its power series has the form
where expressions for the coefficients W ij are computed by expanding the explicit expression for w.
Hence the left-hand side of the boundary condition (5.4) is an analytic function of ε and λ. Its power series expansion shows that the coefficients of ε 0 λ j vanish for j = 0, 1, 2, so that the condition (5.4) reduces to
with (computable) coefficients A i and B ij . This equation has to be solved for λ. Since
and B 00 =μ are non-zero, divide the equation (5.5) by i≥0 A i λ i , and take the third root, obtaining that, for some C ij ,
The right-hand side is an analytic function of λ and ε 1/3 , so that the implicit function theorem (Gunning and Rossi, 2009, Theorem I.B.4) yields a unique solution λ (for ε sufficiently small), which is an analytic function of ε 1/3 . Its power series coefficients can be computed at any order.
Henceforth, consider a small relative bid-ask spread ε > 0, and letλ denote the constant in Lemma 5.2. Moreover, set w(x) := w(λ, x), a := a(λ), b := b(λ), and u := u(λ), l := l(λ). By inspection, it follows that Lemma 5.3. In both cases of Lemma 5.1,
The next lemma states the properties of the function k.
Lemma 5.4. Define
Then k satisfies the linear ODE
with boundary conditions
Moreover, k is strictly decreasing and, in particular, strictly positive on [0, log(u/l)].
Proof. That k satisfies the ODE follows by insertion. The identities cos 2 [tan −1 (x)] = 1/(1 + x 2 ) and sinh 2 [coth −1 (x)] = 1/(x 2 − 1) yield the boundary condition at zero, whereas the boundary condition at log(u/l) follows by inserting w (log(u/l)) =μ +λ. Finally, the ODE and a comparison argument yield that k is strictly decreasing.
and g satisfies the boundary and smooth pasting conditions
g (e y )e y g (e y ) + 2μ − 2w(y) = 0. (5.6)
Proof. The explicit representation follows by elementary integration. Evidently, g(1) = 1. Moreover, g(u/l) = (1−ε)u/l follows by insertingμ+λ = w(log(u/l)). Next, since g (e y ) = 1/e y k(y), the boundary conditions for g and k imply the smooth pasting conditions g (1) = 1 and g (u/l) = 1− ε. Furthermore, k > 0 and g (e y ) = 1/e y k(y) show that g > 0. Finally, computing the derivatives verifies that g indeed satisfies the ODE (5.6).
The shadow price and verification
The construction of the shadow price proceeds in analogy to logarithmic utilities (Gerhold, MuhleKarbe and Schachermayer, 2010b,a) and power utilities (GGMKS). For y ∈ [0, log(u/l)], let Y be a Brownian motion with drift, reflected at 0 and log(u/l), that is, the continuous, adapted process with values in [0, log(u/l)] such that
for nondecreasing adapted local time processes L and U increasing only on the sets {Y t = 0} and {Y t = log(u/l)}, respectively.
Lemma 5.6. Define Note that the first (resp. second) case in (5.8) occurs if the initial position ξS 0 in the risky asset lies below the buying boundary l or above the selling boundary u. Then, there is a jump from the initial position (ϕ 0 0− , ϕ 0− ) = (ξ 0 , ξ), which moves the position in the risky asset to the nearest boundary of the interval [l, u] . Since this initial trade involves the purchase (resp. sale) of shares, the initial value ofS is chosen to match the initial ask (resp. bid) price.
Proof of Lemma 5.6. The first part of the assertion follows from the smooth pasting conditions for g and Itô's formula. As for the second part, since g (1) ≤ 0, a comparison argument yields that the derivative (g (y)y − g(y))/y 2 of g(y)/y is non-positive. Hence g(1)/1 = 1 and
The long-run optimal portfolio in the frictionless "shadow market" with price processS can be determined by calculating finite horizon bounds, similarly as in Guasoni and Robertson (2011) for power utility. Note that for the exponential utilities considered here the myopic probability coincides with the (unique) risk-neutral probability forS.
Lemma 5.7.w(y) = w(y) − αg (e y )e y l, with w and g as in Lemmas 5.1 and 5.5, solves the ODẼ
with boundary conditionsw(0) =w(log(u/l)) = 0. Moreover, denoting byq(y) = y 0w (z)dz, the shadow payoffX T corresponding to the policyη =
(in terms ofS) and the shadow discount factor M T = E(− · 0μ σ dW t ) T satisfies the following bounds:
Here,β = (μ 2 −λ 2 )/2α andẼ[·] denotes the expectation with respect to the risk-neutral probabilitỹ Q forS with density process M .
Proof. Thatw solves the ODE (5.9) is easily verified by taking derivatives, while the boundary conditions immediately follow from their counterparts for w and g. Next, note thatμ,σ,η,w are functions of Y t , but their argument is omitted throughout to ease notation. To prove the first bound (5.10), notice that the shadow wealth processX satisfies: 12) where the second equality follows by substitutingη = 1 α (μ σ 2 − σ σw ). Now, Itô's formula and the boundary conditionsw(0) =w(log(u/l)) = 0 implỹ
Plugging in the ODE forw, it follows that
Using this identity to replace T 0 σwdW t in (5.12) and taking expectations then yields
The first bound now follows by noticing that, sinceμ(·)/σ(·) is bounded on the support [0, log(u/l)] of its argument, the nonnegative local martingale M is in fact a true martingale, such thatQ is well-defined. As for the second bound, first notice that by definition of M and Girsanov's theorem, 14) whereW t = W t + t 0μ σ dt denotes aQ-Brownian motion. Again by using that the processμ/σ is bounded, it follows that the stochastic integral in (5.14) is aQ-martingale with vanishing expectation. Using (5.13), also rewritten in terms ofW , to replace the Lebesgue integral in (5.14) then shows
Sincew(·) is bounded on [0, log(u/l)], the dW t -term in this expression is aQ-martingale, which yields the second bound (5.11). The asymptotics follow by expanding the functionq as in the proof of GGMKS, Theorem 3.1
With the finite horizon bounds at hand, we can now establish that the policyη is indeed long-run optimal in the frictionless market with priceS.
Lemma 5.8. The policyη
is long-run optimal with equivalent annuity σ 2β in the frictionless market with price processS. The corresponding wealth process (in terms ofS), and the numbers of safe and risky units satisfỹ
Proof. The formulas for the trading strategy and the wealth process associated toη are immediate consequences of the respective definitions. The second representation forη follows by inserting the definitions ofμ,σ from Lemma 5.6, the ODE (5.6) for g, and w(y) −w(y) = αg (e y )e y l. Next, note that ϕ is admissible forS, because (5.15) shows that the corresponding risky positioñ η is bounded. Now, standard duality arguments for exponential utility imply that the shadow payof X φ corresponding to any admissible strategy φ satisfies the inequality
Indeed, sinceσ(Y ) is uniformly bounded and the same holds for φS by admissibility of φ and (1 − ε)S ≤S ≤ S, the localQ-
, such that (5.16) follows from theQ-martingale property of the shadow wealth processX φ . Inequality (5.16) in turn yields the following upper bound, valid for any admissible strategy φ in the frictionless market with price processS:
The functionq from Lemma 5.7 is bounded on the compact support of its argument Y . Hence, the second bound in Lemma 5.7 implies that the right-hand side equals σ 2β . Likewise, the first bound in the same lemma implies that the shadow payoffX ϕ (corresponding to the policy ϕ) attains this upper bound concluding the proof.
The next Lemma establishes thatS is a shadow price.
Lemma 5.9. The number of shares ϕ =η/S in the portfolioη in Lemma 5.8 has the dynamics
Thus, ϕ increases only when Y t = 0, that is, whenS equals the ask price, and decreases only when Y t = log(u/l), that is, whenS equals the bid price.
Proof. Itô's formula applied to (5.15) yields
Integrating ϕ =η/S by parts, inserting the dynamics ofη andS, and simplifying, it follows that
Since L and U only increase on the sets {Y = 0} and {Y = log(u/l)}, respectively, the assertion now follows from the boundary conditions for g and g .
The equivalent annuity for any frictionless price within the bid-ask spread must be greater or equal than in the original market with bid-ask process ((1 − ε)S, S), because the investor trades at more favorable prices. For a shadow price, there is an optimal strategy that only entails buying (resp. selling) stocks whenS coincides with the ask-resp. bid price. Hence, this strategy yields the same payoff when executed at bid-ask prices, and is also optimal in the original model with transaction costs. The corresponding equivalent annuity must also be the same, since the difference due to the liquidation costs vanishes as the horizon grows in (2.1):
Proposition 5.10. LetS be the shadow price for ((1 − ε)S, S) from Lemma 5.6, and (ϕ 0 , ϕ) the corresponding long-run optimal strategy from Lemma 5.8. Then (ϕ 0 , ϕ) is long-run optimal for the bid-ask process ((1 − ε)S, S) as well, with the same equivalent annuity σ 2β .
by Lemma 5.2. Item ii) of Theorem 2.3 follows immediately by comparing the growth rate to its frictionless value. Next, sinceS is a shadow price, the buy resp. sell boundaries for (ϕ 0 , ϕ) are quoted in terms of the ask resp. bid price. Item iii) then follows from the representation in Lemma 5.8, combined with the boundary conditions for g and the definitions of u, l in Lemma 5.2. The corresponding asymptotic expansions in vi) are an immediate consequence of the fractional power series forλ (cf. Lemma 5.2) and Taylor expansion. Finally, Theorem 3.2 has been established in Lemma 5.7 and the proof of Lemma 5.8.
Next, we prove Theorem 3.3, which generalizes the finite-horizon bounds to a market with several uncorrelated assets.
Proof of Theorem 3.3.
dW i t ) be the stochastic discount factor in the market (S 0 ,S i ), where the coefficientsμ i ,σ i and the reflected Brownian motions Y i are defined as in Lemma 5.6. Then, since the risky assets S i are independent, the same holds for the processes Y i , M i ,S i . For the shadow wealth processX ϕ =X
t dS i t , the first univariate finite horizon bound in Lemma 5.7 therefore yields Next, notice that since eachS i only depends on one of the independent Brownian motions, Girsanov's theorem implies that
In view of the boundedness of theq i , this inequality yields lim inf
Together with (5.18), it follows that the strategy ϕ is optimal in the frictionless market with risky assetS. Since, by definition ofS i and Lemma 5.9, the strategy ϕ only purchases resp. sells shares of the risky asset i whenS i = S i resp.S i = (1 − ε)S i , the processS is a shadow price. It then follows as in the proof of Proposition 5.10 that the same strategy is also optimal with the same equivalent annuity in the original market with transaction costs, completing the proof.
Trading volume
As above, let ϕ t = ϕ ↑ − ϕ ↓ denote the number of risky units at time t, written as the difference of the cumulated numbers of shares bought resp. sold until t. Relative turnover, defined as the measureS t dϕ t /S t ϕ t = dϕ t /ϕ t = dϕ ↑ t /|ϕ t | + dϕ ↓ t /|ϕ t |, is a scale-invariant indicator of trading volume, compare Lo and Wang (2000) . The long-term average relative turnover is defined as
Similarly, absolute turnover (1 − ε)S t dϕ ↓ t + S t dϕ ↑ t is defined as the amount of wealth transacted, evaluated in terms of the bid price (1 − ε)S t when selling shares resp. in terms of the ask price S when purchasing them. As above, the long-term average absolute turnover is then defined as (1 − ε)S t dϕ
Proof. The formula for the relative turnover follows form the representation for dϕ/ϕ in Lemma 5.9. The formulas for the absolute turnover follow analogously by noticing that (1 − ε)S t ϕ t = (μ −λ)/α on the set {Y t = 0} where L increases, and likewise S t ϕ t = (μ +λ)/α on the set {Y t = log(u/l)} where U increases.
Using the long-term limits of the local times L and U determined in GGMKS, Lemma D.1, it follows that the long-run averages of the local times admit explicit formulas in terms of the gapλ. These in turn yield the asymptotic expansions for ε ↓ 0 stated in Theorem 2.3 via Taylor expansion.
Connection to constant relative risk aversion
Finally, we prove Theorem 3.1, which states that all relevant quantities, i.e., liquidity premium, optimal policy, equivalent annuity, and trading volume, for an investor with constant absolute risk aversion arise in the limit for increasing constant relative risk aversion.
To this end it suffices to show that the gap of (GGMKS, Lemma 4.2) for relative risk aversion γ converges to its counterpart in our Lemma 5.2 for constant absolute risk aversion α, as γ ↑ ∞. Note that this convergence holds for any level of absolute risk aversion, since our gap is independent of the latter.
Theorem 5.12. As the relative risk aversion γ in (GGMKS, Lemma B.2) tends to infinity, their gapλ γ converges to our counterpartλ in Lemma 5.2, which is the gap for all levels α of absolute risk aversion.
Proof. For small ε, the gap 10λ γ of GGMKS is given by the unique root of the function
where the function w γ is given explicitly in GGMKS, Lemma B.1. Now note that as the relative risk aversion γ becomes large, Case 2 of GGMKS, Lemma B.1 applies ifμ > 1/4 and Case 3 applies ifμ ≤ 1/4. By inspection of the explicit formulas in GGMKS, Lemma B.1 resp. our Lemma 5.1, it follows that, as γ ↑ ∞, the function γw γ (·) converges uniformly on compacts to w from our Lemma 5.1. Since the same holds for the functions u γ (·), l γ (·) from GGMKS, Lemma B.2 and u(·), l(·) from our Lemma 5.2, this in turn yields that f γ (·) converges uniformly on compacts to f (λ) = w(λ, log[u(λ)/l(λ)]) − (μ +λ).
Since our gapλ is the unique root of this function, it suffices to show that the zeros of f γ also converge as γ ↑ ∞. But this follows, because a calculation shows that, for small ε, the derivative ∂ ∂λ f is bounded away from zero in a neighborhood of the root of f , completing the proof. The convergence of all other quantities -suitably rescaled for the trading policies, the equivalent safe rate and wealth turnover -follows immediately from the explicit formulas in GGMKS and in this paper.
